What is this, more troops, more war, tell me, is this insanity ever going to end? The national security issues the United States faces are mainly INTERNAL.  9/11 was: an internal security screwup:  we couldn’t even defend our own airspace. That’s what is needed. The "War on Terror" (sic) is for the benefit of defense contractors. 

Nevertheless at this point, there is little choice but to get it right.  One wonders, how could it have been so mishandled by Bush/Cheney/Rumsfeld? Why don’t you go back and watch the first 30 minutes of Saving Private Ryan and if you think you are ready for that, you should join the Marine Corps or the Army Rangers, like Pat Tillman for example, and really do something heroic. Because if you can’t, then just shut up as we are all sick of listening to your chauvinistic psychobabble.  At long last, get it done.
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It would seem that the war in Afghanistan has finally reached a milestone. In October 2001 the U.S. engaged the Taliban and pursued Al Qaeda into the mountains of Tora Bora near the Khyber Pass as a consequence of the September 11, 2001 terrorist attacks.  After the overthrow of the Taliban in 2001-2002 the United States shifted its interest to the upcoming invasion of Iraq.  Now the Obama administration has refocused to Afghanistan and after placing General Stanley McChrystal in the leadership role, McChrystal has been preparing his assessment of the situation and outlining exactly what the mission status is. 

A redacted but apparently confidential copy of McChystal's report was obtained by Bob Woodward and published by the Washington Post.  There "leak" and its implications is a topic of a September 29, 2009 Politico article A D.C. whodunit: Who leaked and why.  As embarrassing as the "leak" was to the Obama administration, in the report itself McChrystal asserts a number of salients which, if accurate,  do not bode well for U.S. foreign policy in Central Asia.  For example:

The stakes in Afghanistan are high (and) the situation in Afghanistan is serious; neither success nor failure can be taken for granted.  Although considerable effort and sacrifice have resulted in some progress, many indicators suggest the overall situation is deteriorating.  We face not only a resilient and growing insurgency; there is also a crisis of confidence among Afghans – in both their government and the international community – that undermines our credibility and emboldens the insurgents.  Further, a perception that our resolve is uncertain makes Afghans reluctant to align with us against the insurgents.

And:

(W)e face both a short and long-term fight.  The long-term fight will require patience and commitment, but I believe the short-term fight will be decisive.  Failure to gain the initiative and reverse insurgent momentum in the near-term (next 12 months) – while Afghan security capacity matures - risks an outcome where defeating the insurgency is no longer possible.

General McChrystal cites many reasons supporting his conclusions and outlines in broad terms what efforts will be needed to avert them and reestablish U.S./NATO control of the Afghan countryside it had achieved in 2002.  If one studies the entire document one can discern that he calling for a sea change in the approach the U.S. and NATO forces must employ to achieve the stated objective: in short creating a legitimate and stable government in Afghanistan that can assume control of its security needs and provide a peaceful environment for the population.  This essentially will mean defeating the Taliban as well as any elements of Al Qaeda (this time for real). 

He also discusses at some length the relationship between success in Afghanistan and the role Pakistan will play in the effort.

Afghanistan's insurgency is clearly supported from Pakistan.  Senior leaders of the major Afghan insurgent groups are based in Pakistan and, are linked with al Qaeda and other violent extremist groups, and are reportedly aided by some elements of Pakistan's ISI (Inter-Services Intelligence). 

The U.S. has pressured Pakistan to take a larger role in attacking Al Qaeda and Taliban elements in the so-called Tribal Areas along the Afghan-Pakistan border for some time now.  Recently it seems to have instilled a reaction in Pakistan.

Pakistan moved large contingents of troops into the Taliban songhold of South Waziristan on Saturday, beginning a long-anticipated ground offensive against Al Qaedaand Taliban militants in treacherous terrain that has overwhelmed the army in the past, the Pakistani Army said.   The United States has been pressing the Pakistani Army to move ahead with the campaign in South Waziristan, arguing that it was vital for Pakistan to show resolve against the Qaeda-fortified Pakistani Taliban, which now embraces a vast and dedicated network of militant groups arrayed against the state, including those nurtured by Pakistan to fight India.

The report though is McChrystal's viewpoint and his assumption in writing it was that it would be received by a very selective audience, specifically the president and his cabinet.  One can be fairly certain of that.  And while the General's concerns would be welcomed, they would be subject to review by members of the National Security apparatus and other viewpoints were certain to be presented as well.  However when it was "leaked" and its contents published all over the world, one might say that it lost its intended audience.

Nevertheless what was in it was hardly a surprise and the selections I have cited are good examples of what was expected.   While there is no specific mention of an additional troop deployment, it would be mistaken to assume that such a specific request would be contained in this document.  There can be little doubt however, to achieve the political and military objectives outlined, additional troops will be requested by the military.  More troops could be a hard sell in Congress and to the American people as well.   This has not been lost on the President.

Although Obama endorsed a strategy document in March that called for "executing and resourcing an integrated civilian-military counterinsurgency strategy," there have been significant changes in Afghanistan and Washington since then. A disputed presidential election, an erosion in support for the war effort among Democrats in Congress and the American public, and a sharp increase in U.S. casualties have prompted the president and his top advisers to reexamine their assumptions about the U.S. role in defeating the Taliban insurgency.

Instead of debating whether to give McChrystal, the top U.S. commander in Afghanistan, more troops, the discussion in the White House is now focused on whether, after eight years of war, the United States should vastly expand counterinsurgency efforts along the lines he has proposed -- which involve an intensive program to improve security and governance in key population centers -- or whether it should begin shifting its approach away from such initiatives and simply target leaders of terrorist groups who try to return to Afghanistan.

If one has read and understood all that I have written, everything so far might be summed up as this: 

The 8 year war in Afghanistan in not going as well as the U.S. and NATO would like.  In particular, the client government it established in 2001/2002 does not have the support of Afghan citizens; a recent election is widely viewed as fradulent.

Obama has made this war a priority however and was one of the issues he campaigned on. 

He personally appointed McChrystal to lead the NATO forces there and committed an additional 20,000 U.S. troops. 

Including the non-U.S. NATO forces, McChrystal now commands over 100,000 troops on the ground plus air assets. 

McChrystal has given a written report with his assessment and recommendations to the president and his National Security advisors.   The report stipulates that a window now exists for executing scenarios that will determine mission success or failure.

The fact that the White House is considering options that differ from what McChrystal’s report recommends is not atypical. 

In any event, McChrystal's report was obtained by Bob Woodward and published in totality in the Washington Post.  Woodward has made a career of such activities so one can't necessarily say this event is unusual but it has complicated matters considerabily. 

To add further confusion on what the government is planning, McChrystal attempted to respond to his perceived critics in a speech and question and answer session in London.   This illicited a response from the Secretary of Defense (Robert Gates) and National Security Advisor (James L. Jones). who essentially said that advice to the President should be "candid but discreet";   Obama and McChrystal met recently and they seem to have firmed up their working relationship.  Most feel that inspite of the observed breach, Obama has no intention of replacing the General at this point.  According to the New York Times, in a recent meeting Obama said "I put him there to give me a frank assessment." 

It should be remembered that these theatrics are only occurring now as a result of the leaked report.  One wonders what Bob Woodward is trying to do at this point in his career. 
 
For additional perspectives on this, see Eugene Robinson's Out of Line on Afghanistan and Afghan Strategy Divides Lawmakers, both in the Washington Post.   

There is a point of diminishing returns when adding foreign solders to a counterinsurgency effort.  It would be better to have Afghan forces like the Northern Alliance in the mix.  If one recalls, with the assistance of relatively small American and NATO ground elements coupled with extensive U.S. air assets, they did well in a limited way in bringing down the Taliban in 2001. 

However the "air assets" the U.S. now has available are not as applicable to counterinsurgency as they are to something like dismantling the Iraqi air force in the first gulf war, Desert Storm.  The U.S. military is largely trained to fight wars against another military force.  Such a force is not as adaptable to counterinsurgency as one might think. 

FYI:  Counter insurgency is still largely theoretical and one key element in it is a stable local government; obviously this is now seen as largely lacking in Afghanistan and is a critical problem.   

There is an Afghan army though.  Ostensibly they are now being “trained”  by the U.S. and NATO.  Sooner or later, they are going to have to carry the entire load themselves because the U.S. simply cannot maintain a long military occupation of Afghanistan any more than it could in Iraq.